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هى دى قطر
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Articles In Egypt: Turkey, Qatar Fund Terror, Are Responsible For Bloodshed In Arab World
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Qatar:  Terror Financing and Support of Terrorist Groups.   January 13, 2017



B.       The United Nations Sanctions List—Qatar.

I.                    The following list concerns Qatari facilitators of terror funding of Daesh/ISIL, Al Nusrah Front and Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI). It was obtained from The United Nations Security Council List of Designated Individuals”, updated June 13, 2017.  Some of the details pertaining to the individuals below have been edited for clarity, highlighting only Qatar national identity and/or residence, and terror-financing activity.

1.      Abdl Malik Muhammad Yusuf Uthman abd al Salam, national identification: Qatar; National identification no: Qatar 28940000602, issued in Qatar. Facilitator who provides financial, material, and technological support for Al-Qaida. On INTERPOL Special Notice. (https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/584).

2.      Ashraf Muhammad Yusif Uthman abd al Salam. National identification no: Qatar 28440000526, issued in Qatar. A member of Al-Qaida as of 2012 and a fighter in the Syrian Arab Republic since early 2014. Provided financial, material, and technological support for AlQaida, Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant and Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). On INTERPOL Special Notice.https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5843240.

II.                  The following listconcerns terrorist funding of Al Qaeda and the Taliban was obtained from: The United Nations Security Council “Reports from Member States Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1455, adopted on January 17, 2003:

1.       Sa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka'bi was listed on September 21, 2015 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 ofresolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of” Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant.

2.       Abd al-Latif bin Abdallah Salih Muhammad al-Kawari was listed on September 21, 2015 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of” Al-Qaida.

3.       'Abd al-Malik Muhammad Yusuf 'Uthman 'Abd al-Salam was listed on January 23, 2015pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of”, “supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to”, “recruiting for” or “otherwise supporting acts or activities of” Al-Qaida (QDe.004) and Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant

4.       Khalifa Muhammad Turki al-Subaiy was listed on October 10, 2008 pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1822 (2008) as being associated with Al-Qaida (QDe.004) for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of”, “recruiting for” and “otherwise supporting the acts or activities of” Al-Qaida and its senior leadership.


C.      U.S. Department of State

1.      “Overall, Qatar’s security services workforce was reliant on manpower from third countries to fill rank-and-file law enforcement positions. This limitation applies across the board with all Qatari government institutions (except for the Qatar State Security and elite units of the Ministry of Interior’s internal security force), and is commensurate with the demographics of the nation. Lack of capacity and to some extent the lack of advanced training of non-Qataris contributed to a lack of effectiveness in basic police operations”. “Qatar”: U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, 2015.  [The year 2015 is the latest edition available for this report].

2.      Despite [counterterrorism efforts], entities and individuals within Qatar continue to serve as a source of financial support for terrorist and violent extremist groups, particularly regional al-Qa’ida affiliates such as the Nusrah Front. Qatar has made efforts to prosecute significant terrorist financiers.” – “Qatar”: U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, 2015.





D.     Think Tank Studies and Journals: Qatar and Terror-Financing; Qatar and Support for Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood.



“Qatar is unquestionably engaged in international terrorist financing. According to the U.S. Treasury’s division for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, “Qatar, a longtime U.S. ally, has for many years openly financed Hamas.”From: The Institute for Contemporary AffairsFounded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation.  September 23, 2014.

This report continues:

·         Qatar aids Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jabhat al Nusra, al-Qaeda affiliates, Libyan Islamists, and even ISIS.

·         The key Qatari link to the Muslim Brotherhood has been Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who broadcasts on Qatar’s al Jazeera. In 2002, his foundation was designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. government.

·         Through the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar has attempted to undermine Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

·         Qatar is also active in North Africa. The French press carried repeated reports that Qatar was financing jihadist elements in Northern Mali, including MUJAO (the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa), Ansar Dine (affiliated with al-Qaeda), and even secularist Tuareg separatists belonging to the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad). There were also reports quoting the French Directorate of Intelligence (DRM) claiming that Qatar was financing AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb). Prior to the French intervention in Mali, its northern region was emerging as an African Afghanistan. Notably, the Qatari Red Crescent was the only humanitarian organization operating in Northern Mali after the Islamist takeover.

·         Qatar also has extensive ties to Islamist elements fighting in Libya since Qaddafi’s overthrow.6Sheikh Ali al-Salabi was a Libyan Islamist with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood who took refuge in Qatar in 1999 but later returned to Libya, where he served as a conduit for Qatari-supplied arms to Islamist forces.   Indeed, after Qaddafi’s fall, Libya’s transitional prime minister, Mahmoud Jibril, complained that Qatar was still arming extremist groups in Libya opposed to his leadership.


·         The most important Islamist connection for Qatar is the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar has not only backed its Middle Eastern activities, but it has also emerged as one of the largest institutional funders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe.8 Qatar has been accused of supporting a Muslim Brotherhood terrorist cell that was discovered in the UAE in 2012.

·         The key player in the Qatari link to the Muslim Brotherhood has been Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. In 1961, he was sent by al-Azhar University in Egypt to head its Qatari branch. Since that time, he has emerged as a most important spiritual authority in the international Muslim Brotherhood movement. He also became the supreme religious authority for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch, Hamas. Through his fatwas, which were featured on Hamas’ website, he supported Hamas suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilians; he also supported suicide attacks against US forces in Iraq. He established a global charity, known as the Union of Good, which served as a conduit for Hamas financing.

From: The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies: “Qatar and Terror Finance”, January 18, 2017. The following is from the Introduction to this report, available at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/david-weinberg-qatar-and-terror-finance/
It is particularly vital to evaluate Qatar’s record on terror finance in light of the Nusra Front’s July 2016 decision to rebrand itself as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS), which purports to have “no relationship with any foreign party.
According to sources cited by Reuters, Qatar led an effort starting in 2015 to bolster the Syrian opposition by persuading Nusra to distance itself from al-Qaeda.”
Reuters reported that intelligence officials from Qatar and other Gulf states met several times with Nusra’s leader around this period to suggest that his group could receive money, arms, and supplies after stepping away from al-Qaeda.
Yet the more JFS legitimates itself by integrating into the broader Syrian opposition, the greater the risk of a permanent al-Qaeda army on Europe’s doorstep. This report is Part Two of a three-part series on Qatar’s record dealing with terrorist finance and its practitioners. Part One outlined Doha’s dismal record at punishing funders of terror throughout Emir Hamad’s reign.
This document evaluates the publicly available evidence on Qatar’s record since then, focusing primarily on individuals sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2014 and 2015. All of these sanctions were imposed after Qatar agreed in September 2014, as part of a U.S.-led initiative called the Jeddah Communiqué, to bring terror financiers to justice. The cases should therefore be seen as a measuring stick for recent Qatari conduct.”   See: www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/david-weinberg-qatar-and-terror-finance/#sthash.iKhmZrc1.dpuf.

Elizabeth Dickerson, Foreign Policy Magazine  “The Case Against Qatar”, September 30, 2014.
“On one hand, Washington hasn’t shied away from calling on Doha’s connections when it needs them. But that same Qatari network has also played a major role in destabilizing nearly every trouble spot in the region and in accelerating the growth of radical and jihadi factions. The results have ranged from bad to catastrophic in the countries that are the beneficiaries of Qatari aid: Libya is mired in a war between proxy-funded militias, Syria’s opposition has been overwhelmed by infightingand overtaken by extremists, and Hamas’s intransigence has arguably helped prolong the Gaza Strip’s humanitarian plight.
For years, U.S. officials have been willing to shrug off Doha’s proxy network — or even take advantage of it from time to time. Qatar’s neighbors, however, have not.

Over the past year, fellow Gulf countries Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain have publicly rebuked Qatar for its support of political Islamists across the region. These countries have threatened to close land borders or suspend Qatar’s membership in the regional Gulf Cooperation Council unless the country backs down. After nearly a year of pressure, the firstAfter nearly a year of pressure, the first sign of a Qatari concession came on Sept. 13, [2014] when seven senior Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood figures left Doha at the request of the Doha government. “

William McCants, “Islamist Outlaws: Saudi Arabia Takes on the Brotherhood”. Foreign Affairs, The Council on Foreign Relations, March 2014
This article stresses the terrorist threat that the Muslim Brotherhood, supported by Qatar, poses upon Saudi Arabia—and has for decades
On March 7, Saudi Arabia took the extraordinary step of declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, on par with Hezbollah and al Qaeda. The move came just two days after the kingdom, together with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, withdrew its ambassador from Qatar because of Qatar’s alleged support of Brotherhood interference in internal politics. Although Saudi Arabia’s dislike of Brotherhood political activities abroad is well known, for decades the kingdom has tolerated (and sometimes even worked with) the local Saudi branch of the Brotherhood. Its sudden reversal is an expression of solidarity with its politically vulnerable allies in the region and a warning to Sunni Islamists within its borders to tr]ad carefully” [...]
Saudi Arabia’s moves have provoked some unhappiness at home. Saudi Islamists, particularly the Brothers, are convinced that Morsi’s overthrow was part of a Saudi plot to roll back Islamist political gains of the past three years. In defiance, they festooned their social media profiles with symbols of Brotherhood resistance and criticized their government for its complicity. The defiance has become more muted recently, after the local press reported that the government was contemplating declaring the Brotherhood a terrorist organization. According to former members of the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood I spoke with, the 25,000 or so members of the Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia reacted to the news of the deliberations by preemptively keeping a low profile, closing some of its gatherings so as not to further stoke the government’s ire. Until the Saudi government actually begins making arrests, its recent announcement is more of a shot across the Brotherhood’s bow than an attempt to sink the ship.”
Nevertheless, person after person I interviewed asserted that the level of Islamist anger toward the Saudi government is higher than at any time since the early 1990s” […]

E.      International Criticism:  The United Kingdom, Germany, the European Union

1.        On October 25, 2014, The Daily Telegraph(UK) reported that former Prime Minister David Cameron had strong concerns about terror-financing in Qatar, a subject he brought up with the state visit of former Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani.   The headline of the article read:  “David Cameron Urged to Press Emir of Qatar on Terror Funds”, adding: “The Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, will arrive in Britain amid a growing furor over his country’s alleged links to the financing of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al Qaeda”.

The newspaper article continues:
It is understood that the Emir will also meet with Sir John Sawers, the head of MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service. Critics of Qatar will want that meeting to focus on why the state has not done more to stop the fund-raisers operating from its capital Doha.”
And:
“The negotiations follow warnings from the Obama administration last week that Qatar and Kuwait remain fertile grounds for terrorist funders. David Cohen, the US official in charge of terrorism and financial intelligence, said the two states were "permissive jurisdictions for terrorist financing"[…]
“Stephen Barclay, the Tory MP for North-East Cambridgeshire, who has repeatedly called for transparency in Britain’s dealings with Qatar and other Gulf states, said it was "essential" for Mr Cameron to raise the issue of terror financing with the Emir.” […]
“[Barclay stated]: “There is clear evidence that Qatari nationals have been instrumental in the financing of Sunni terror groups and the Prime Minister should not avoid tackling this issue head on with the Emir."
Douglas Alexander, Labour’s shadow foreign secretary, said wealthy Qataris and Kuwaitis had channelled millions of dollars to terrorists and accused the countries of having "weak money-laundering" laws […]”.

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The same newspaper also reported in November 2014 on terrorist financiers “living without impunity” in Qatar despite being on U.S. Department of the Treasury and United Nations designated persons/sanctions lists.  (“Terror Financiers Are Living Freely in Qatar, U.S. Discloses”, The Daily Telegraph (UK), November 16, 2014)
2.      Two of al-Qaeda’s most senior financiers are living with impunity in Qatar despite being on a worldwide terrorism blacklist, [an] American official in charge of sanctions has disclosed. The two Qataris —Khalifa Muhammad Turki al Subaiy and Abd al-Rahman bin Umayr al-Nuaymi--are living in Doha, the country’s capital, and are free to go as they please, according to David Cohen, the US Treasury under-secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence.
Mr Cohen has accused Qatar and its near neighbour Kuwait of being “permissive jurisdictions for terrorist financing” but until now the fate of a number of money men — identified as Specially Designated Global Terrorists by the US government — has not been known.
Qatar has refused to say what has happened to al-Subaiy, al-Nuaymi and others on US and United Nations terrorism sanctions lists.
The Telegraph has asked over a number of weeks about the status of the men and Qatar has refused to answer.
But during a question and answer session following a keynote speech in Washington, a transcript of which has been obtained by The Telegraph, Mr Cohen said: “There are US- and UN-designated terrorist financiers in Qatar that have not been acted against under Qatari law. There’s Khalifa al-Subaiy — and more recently, Abd al-Nuaymi, who we designated last December, the UN designated in August.” Mr Cohen added that both men were residents in Qatar.
Al-Subaiy, 49, a former Qatari Central Bank employee, was blacklisted as a terrorist fundraiser as long ago as 2008 but still appears to be heavily involved in a jihadist network. According to the official American report, al-Subaiy was identified as “a Qatar-based terrorist financier and facilitator who has provided financial support to, and acted on behalf of, al-Qaeda senior leadership, including senior al-Qaeda leader Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) prior to KSM’s capture in March 2003”.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed has been named as the “principal architect of the 9/11 attacks” and is being held in Guantánamo Bay
Al-Nuaymi, a former president of the Qatar Football Association, is accused of being one of the world’s most prolific terrorist fundraisers, accused of sending more than £1.25million a month to al-Qaeda jihadists in Iraq and hundreds of thousands of pounds to Syria. He was designated a terrorist in the US last December and added to a British sanctions list only in October this year.
It is alleged that both men’s links to senior figures in Qatar has helped keep them out of jail in recent years and off Qatar’s own terrorist sanctions list. The country introduced a designated terrorist list but to date not a single individual has been put on it.




F.         Conclusion: General Overview Statements on Qatar.
From:Qatar: Governance, Security and U.S. Policy; Kenneth Katzman, Specialist Middle Eastern Affairs, June 9, 2017.
“Qatar’s policies – particularly its support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations as a positive example of “political Islam” - continue to plague relations between Qatar and some other GCC members. Saudi Arabia and the UAE assert that the Brotherhood is a threat to regional and domestic security and have taken generally opposed engaging Iran diplomatically.” (Intro)
“[R]adical Islamist organizations profess ideologies that are attractive to some Qatari citizens, and there have been repeated accusations by international observers that wealthy Qataris have contributed funds and services to these groups. Members of Congress generally have taken into account these and all the other aspects of Qatar’s policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar.”  (Intro)
“[S]ome groups that the United States considers as terrorist organizations - such as Hamas - are considered by Qatar to be legitimate Arab movements pursuing goals with which Qatari officials and citizens often agree” (p. 16)
“Some experts have noted that the government has violated a pledge to the United States not to allow Qatari preachers to conduct what some consider religious incitement in mosques in Education City, where several U.S. universities have branches” (p. 16)
“In the past, perhaps before the global threat from the Al-Qaida organization was acute, at least one high-ranking Qatari official provided support to Al-Qaida figures residing in or transiting Qatar, including suspected September 11, 2001, attacks mastermind Khalid Shaykh Mohammad” (p. 16)
[A]ccording to U.S. officials, “entities and individuals within Qatar continue to serve as a source of financial support for terrorist and violent extremist groups, particularly regional Al Qa’ida affiliates such as the Nusrah Front” (p. 17)
 “The United States has imposed sanctions on several persons living in Qatar, including Qatari nationals, for allegedly raising funds or making donations to both Al-Qaida and the Islamic State.”  (p.17)

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